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312 Abstract
Tax havens are not recent phenomena. However, in contrast to historical prece-
dents, tax havens in the age of mobile capital allow for non-consensual transfers 
and are not profitable for every citizen. We discuss the four main groups of tax 
havens (former Western possessions, sovereign nations, countries controlled by 
cartels, and emerging economies). This article also synthesizes the history of tax 
havens and describes their current heterogeneity, discussing the main methods 
available to regulate tax haven flows. Some of the most efficient methods involve 
unilateral measures (such as the Fiscal Transparency of Outland Societies) but 
also encompass multilateral measures (such as Tax Harmonization and the Re-
quest for Information).
Keywords: tax havens, regulation, transparency
1 introduction
Tax havens are a relevant issue in public financial management. Whereas some 
governments benefit from the existence of tax havens, others experience losses. 
Because of the critical importance of the emergence of bankruptcy systems in the 
Western world and the recent growth of large financial flows into tax havens, this 
paper addresses the issues presented by this new reality, which has revolutionized 
the financial organization paradigms of states.
This article intends to synthesize the main points of the important discussion on 
tax havens. As we will show, tax havens are not recent innovations – we can easily 
find historical examples indicating that tax havens are instruments that were deve-
loped to foster trade, increase capital mobility, and secure personal gains. Howe-
ver, most of these gains occur as the direct results of the losses experienced by 
other investors.
Currently, various attempts have been made to control tax haven activities and 
flows. In this article, we condense this list of controls to compare clearly the effi-
cacy of these measures.
It is estimated that about half of all international lending and deposits originate in 
Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs), approximately half of which are located in 
OFCs that double as tax havens. The statistics of the Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS) on international assets and liabilities rank the Cayman Islands as the 
fourth largest international financial center in the world; other well-known tax 
havens/OFCs include Switzerland (7th), the Netherlands (8th), Ireland (9th), Singa-
pore (10th), Luxembourg (11th), the Bahamas (15th) and Jersey (19th). In addition, 
these centers are recipients of approximately 30% of world’s share of FDI, and, in 
turn, are the originators of similar amounts of FDI (Palan, Murphy and Chava-
gneux, 2010).
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313Given the strength of actual capital flows and the serious consequences that this 
mobility has for many investors and citizens around the globe, we have attempted 
to synthesize the main points of the current debate on tax havens.
The structure of this paper is as follows: in section two, we will discuss the origins 
of tax havens and their current diversity of forms; in section three, we will focus 
on the macroeconomic and financial consequences of tax havens and discuss the 
reactions of institutions from around the world; we will conclude in section four 
by presenting the main implications of our work.
2 origins of tax havens
Because tax havens are controversial, international institutions have several defi-
nitions for them. Although these definitions share many features, no consensus has 
been reached on a dominant definition. This difficulty is demonstrated in the va-
riety of names attributed to this phenomenon, including “tax haven” (OECD), 
“offshore financial center” (FMI), and “states without taxation” or “states with 
low taxation” (KPMG).
These types of territories are currently characterized by the fact that they allow 
companies of unknown origins to be founded within their boundaries, protecting 
the owner’s identity through a guarantee of absolute secrecy. This ability to ope-
rate outside national and international control is what makes these offshore finan-
cial centers, or tax havens, so special.
2.1 the history of tax havens
The sources of the rationale behind tax havens are tax-resistant behaviors that date 
back to early civilizations and assume forms as varied as allowed by the human 
imagination.
It is difficult to determine the precise origins of the tax haven. Some researchers 
suggest that the second century BC saw the first official instances of these zones 
in the eastern Mediterranean (Plate-forme Paradis Fiscaux et Judiciaires, 2007:9, 
10). Beginning in 166 BC and lasting for nearly a century thereafter, the island of 
Delos practiced a form of commerce that was free of taxes and customs duties. 
Due to its geographical position, the island became a very important center of 
commerce and trade for ivory, textiles, wine, wheat and spices. The same principle 
was implemented in certain cities (‟free towns”) as well as ports and fairs during 
the Middle Ages. The practice was limited by the geographical boundaries of ci-
ties and the duration of fairs. The first of this type of fair was the Lendit Fair, 
which took place near Saint-Denis in the seventh century and was founded by 
King Dagobert. Between the 12th and 14th centuries, the great fairs of Lyons, Brie, 
Champagne and Beaucaire benefited from the same treatment. From the begin-
ning of the Christian era, the city of Marseille was an independent republic with a 
free port that attracted ships and products throughout the Mediterranean.  Marseille 
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314  was a free port until 1481, when the King of France seized the city and the port’s 
status was challenged. Nevertheless, Marseille would retain some of its privileges 
until 1817. 
In America during the 1910s, the term “tax haven” was used to describe a money 
laundering practice in which bandits invested in “wash salons” or laundries with 
machines that allowed them to clean silver. In the 1920s, a new generation of tax 
havens appeared in areas such as the Bahamas, Switzerland and Luxembourg that 
allowed foreigners to deposit capital and escape taxation.
The recent history of tax havens is neither continuous nor linear but rather built on 
ruptures and mutations in different places and times. Great developments occur-
red during two important moments of economic globalization: the first in the 19th 
century, with the expansion of capitalism, and then in the post-war 20th century, 
with the creation of the euro-dollar market in the 1950s (Palan and Chavagneux, 
2007: 28). Only over the last thirty years, however, have tax havens grown expo-
nentially in numbers and importance. This growth was caused by the liberaliza-
tion and deregulation of the financial sphere that began in the early 1980s (Palan 
and Chavagneux, 2007: 43).
The euro-dollar market emerged during a time when the monetary market was no 
longer under North American control. It has since expanded and is now called the 
euromarket; this is the market where foreign currency negotiations take place. 
These currency-backed securities can be negotiated around the world, with Lon-
don serving as a major center. The commercialization of these securities takes 
place through a compensation system (Burn, 2006). 
The term tax haven currently evokes images of tropical islands located at the end 
of the world, where there are palm trees and sun and multimillionaires can get rich 
while relaxing. This notion can be deceptive and harmful because the capital that 
is forwarded to tax havens is growing in importance (apud Mota, Antunesand 
Lopes, 2009: 7). According to the Bank for International Settlements, about half 
of international financial flows from increasingly diverse origins pass through tax 
havens, leading to dramatic consequences from various perspectives. 
2.2 types of tax havens
We can group the various forms of tax havens into four main groups: historically 
Western possessions, sovereign nations, countries controlled by cartels, and emer-
ging states (for an extended list of countries currently labeled as tax havens/of-
fshore centers, see table A1 in the appendix).
The main reasons countries may be labeled tax havens can also vary. As Smith 
(2005) argues, these countries often suffer from a case of ‟mercantilist remini-
scence” – their governments believe that it is better to have large amounts of cash 
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315deposits in local banks; therefore, these governments start a competitive tax race 
that can generate ‟negative” tax rates, which, in practice, translate into a prope-
nsity to pay to receive investments.
Although this approach is more often expressed in the first two varieties of tax 
shelters (historically Western possessions and sovereign nations), the other varie-
ties may also exhibit pro-mercantilist tendencies.  In sovereign nations, in addition 
to mercantilist reminiscence, the need to fund financial systems or requirements 
for financial resources also appears to influence decisions to lower taxes on capital 
to attract monies from agents abroad.
The third variety of tax haven, countries controlled by cartels, exists to serve a 
different function. As suggested by Killebrew and Bernal (2010), these countries 
tend to be used for money laundering. The processes through which this occurs 
are very complex and difficult to systematize. However, in their simplest form, 
these types of tax havens receive printed currency from black markets or parallel 
economies (drug, arms, prostitution, etc.) and inject that money into the interna-
tional financial system using local deposits.
Finally, members of the fourth group, developing economies, benefit from diffe-
rent advantages related to being characterized as tax havens. The monies they re-
ceive tend to be diverted by incumbents in the form of political rents, but there are 
also positive externalities for the general population. Maurer (1997) observed that 
tax havens do, in fact, create local jobs and increase public revenues. The financial 
systems of tax haven economies tend to be more solid. Rikowski (2002) even 
suggests that the tax haven option leads to positive effects on local education.
3 consequences of and reactions to tax havens
3.1 consequences
The first major consequence of tax havens is the increasing inequality of income 
redistribution (Torvik, 2009). Typically, the highest incomes are the most mobile. 
Consequently, tax havens do not shelter the lowest income earners in a population 
but rather the highest. While these rich taxpayers receive higher net incomes (be-
cause they can use tax havens to diminish their taxation bases), the poorest taxpa-
yers tend to pay increasingly higher taxes because they can more reliably be called 
upon to pay their aliquots than their wealthy counterparts.
The second negative consequence of tax havens is growth in inequality related to 
the distribution of social rights (Torvik, 2009). Because small and medium produ-
cers face increased taxation on their income, they have to work more and accept 
poorer working conditions.
The third consequence is the accumulation of imbalances in the balance of 
payments, especially in the capital account. Time after time, national production 
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316 diverges from national income and deficits accumulate in the capital account. 
 These  deficits generate an increased risk of indebtedness, which is essentially paid 
for by those who cannot move their incomes to tax havens.
3.2 regulatory reactions to tax havens
In our framework, control reactions may be divided into unilateral and multila-
teral measures. The unilateral measures available to a state actor include the fol-
lowing: the lifting of banking secrecy, the imposition of fiscal transparency on 
outland societies, the adjustment of transfer prices, the regulatory prevalence of 
substance over form, the reversal of the onus of proof, the declaration of require-
ments, and an assortment of additional measures. Multilateral measures include 
tax harmonization, information requests, and the control of interbank electronic 
messaging. Descriptions of these options are provided below.
3.2.1 Unilateral measures
Unilateral measures imply the involvement of a single state; implementation is 
thus relatively less complex than the implementation of multilateral measures. For 
tax havens, and following some of the literature (Murphy, 2008; Ginevicius and 
Tvaronaviciene, 2010; Plate-forme Paradis Fiscaux et Judiciaires, 2007), the most 
important unilateral measures are the lifting of banking secrecy, the management 
of the fiscal transparency of outland societies, the adjustment of transfer prices, 
and the prevalence of substance over form. We will now describe these measures 
in more detail.
3.2.1.1 Lifting of banking secrecy 
The lifting of banking secrecy is a major breakthrough in terms of transparency 
but fails to solve the broader systemic inconsistencies that account for great dispa-
rities in the distribution of wealth. This measure helps the fight against money 
laundering. Additionally, it prevents the internationalization of money from para-
llel economies, such as crimes or human or drug trafficking. 
3.2.1.2 Fiscal transparency of outland societies
Fiscal transparency from companies abroad refers to the demonstration of wil-
lingness to report and supply accounts and records for any commercial transaction 
conducted by a legal entity registered abroad (Dumludag, 2011). This measure is 
intended to tax the non-returned profits of companies that are established in tax 
havens.
In Portugal, for instance, tax savings of above €100,000.00 must be reported to the 
tax authorities. This obligation is included in decree-law n. 29/2008, which was 
passed on October 29, 2008, and attempts to prevent abusive tax planning. Howe-
ver, this measure relies on self-reporting.
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317In 2010, the Portuguese government extended an amnesty to those who repatria-
ted capital invested in tax havens during 2010 such that amnesty recipients would 
have to pay only 5% of taxes on such repatriated capital. So far, the results of this 
measure are unknown, and there are still many questions about its effectiveness.
As companies use the law of these autonomous jurisdictions (tax havens and off-
shore centers), the request for more transparency of a company by the government 
of another jurisdiction is very difficult. Hence, the OECD adopted cooperative 
signing agreements for the provision of information as a criterion for the recogni-
tion of a tax haven.
3.2.1.3 Adjustment of transfer prices
The adjustment of transfer prices refers to a fiscal authority’s capacity to rectify its 
VAT base by adjusting prices in transactions between entities that have special 
relations with one another when those prices differ from expected prices in condi-
tions of full competition. The full competition price is determined through the 
examination of pricing for transactions of the same type between non-related en-
tities. If no similar transactions are available for examination, the price adjustment 
is calculated using the resale price minus a margin that may represent a profit. 
There are, however, numerous situations in which the method of applying full 
competition pricing encounters large obstacles. Consider, for example, cases in 
which a certain technology is developed solely by one company, when prices in-
clude the costs of guarantees, or when prices are reduced with the goal of penetra-
ting new markets.
In a study carried out by Boyrie, Pak and Zdanowicz (2004), a model for the de-
termination of optimum prices was analyzed to detect abnormal prices in interna-
tional transactions. The foundation of this model is based, however, on data from 
a commodity that is harmonized between the involved entities. Although it is a 
fairly reasonable idea and a good starting point, it is in itself a limited model and 
can even bias results because the task of harmonizing commodities and prices on 
an international scale is a difficult one. Furthermore, in some intrinsically mono-
polistic areas, the word harmonization has no meaning and it is impossible to 
identify a comparison point.
3.2.1.4 Prevalence of substance over form
The prevalence of substance over form refers to the provision of binding legal si-
gnificance and heavier weight to the composition of an economic or other type of 
activity, or the structure of an income-generating activity, than its form, i.e. the 
legal contract that governs it.
This unilateral measure gives the tax authorities the power to reject acts or struc-
tures that are simulated or artificial and that conceal the substance of their activi-
ties with the sole purpose of obtaining fiscal advantages. For example, in the case 
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318 of an athlete or artist whose income originated in a certain state and was then 
placed in a tax haven by a structure created for that purpose, the tax authority 
could extract revenue from such a taxpayer by proving that the structure created 
by that citizen was an artificial structure, developed no substantial activity and 
existed solely to pursue a tax minimization strategy (Burn, 2006).
3.2.1.5 Reversed onus of proof
The reversed onus of proof is a legal rule stating that the accuser is not responsible 
for proving the actions of the accused. For example, in the case of a suspected tax 
leak, if the Treasury began an investigation against a taxpayer based on suspicions 
of tax evasion, it would be up to the taxpayer to prove his innocence. This mea sure 
could possibly yield useful results because it would be the taxpayer’s responsibi-
lity to prove that no tax avoidance scheme was pursued. However, this approach 
invites a great deal of political controversy because in this pursuit of greater jus-
tice, the innocent are made to suffer as well as transgressors (Plateforme Paradis 
Fiscaux et Judiciaires, 2007).
3.2.1.6 Declaration requirements
Declaration requirements force taxpayers to declare periodically any amounts 
paid or due to foreign entities to the tax authorities. An obligation of this type only 
makes sense if the reversed onus of proof is safeguarded. It should be noted, in the 
light of what has already been noted above with regard to the recent decree-law n. 
29/2008, which defines the requirement of communicating fiscal savings above 
€100,000 to the Tax Authorities, that the adoption of fiscal transparency by out-
land societies will have few practical implications if the periodic declaration re-
quirement is not safeguarded along with the reversed onus of proof. As we have 
noted, the declaration becomes dependent on the taxpayer’s initiative.
3.2.1.7 Additional unilateral measures
In addition to the measures mentioned above, the following measures could fit 
within the scope of unilateral action (Plateforme Paradis Fiscaux et Judiciaires, 
2007):
1) Refusal of conventions with tax havens dependent on an authority, such as 
the overseas regions belonging to some Kingdoms/States;
2) Introduction of a withholding tax or the abandonment of favorable fiscal 
treatment for income paid to or placed at the disposal of entities that reside 
in tax havens (this type of tax – withholding taxes – mean that an outflow 
from a country to a certain tax haven would generate a given amount of re-
venues to that country, allowing only a net value that is smaller than the 
initial outflow to be sent to the tax haven);
3) Refusal of access to the judicial system for certain entities typical of tax 
havens; and 
4) Criminalization of certain types of fraud involving the use of tax havens.
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319The U.S. Senate has played a prominent role in this matter. In August 2006, it is-
sued a report entitled “Tax Haven Abuses: The Enablers, The Tools and Secrecy”. 
An investigation was conducted by senators Norm Coleman and Carl Levin over 
the course of a year, during which over 74 summonses led to more than 80 hea-
rings. The report describes 6 real cases, going into the offshore universe in each 
one of them, analyzing in detail all the mechanisms employed, enumerating the 
havens’ promoters and users, and assessing the impact that these operations had 
on U.S. tax revenues. The report also references security issues and the definition 
of anti-laundering laws. One of the investigated cases was the Anderson case, in 
which the Cook Islands were actually pressured to supply information.
Ginevicius and Tvaronaviciene (2010) provided an important insight into the di-
scussion on offshore activities, emphasising that “Any attempts of government to 
restrict offshore activities of local firms could not be effective enough if, like in 
Lithuanian case, the other jurisdictions, such as e.g. Russia, leaves opportunity to 
use ‘tax havens’ legally. Therefore, improvement of business climate in own 
country should be emphasized due to restrict lure of offshore companies.”
3.2.2 Multilateral measures
Multilateral measures imply the involvement of various states and the cooperation 
of multiple parties, so their implementation is complex. Below, we present a sum-
mary of these measures.
3.2.2.1 Tax harmonization 
In practice, tax harmonization involves the practice of seeking to align direct taxa-
tion rates more closely in all judicial spaces (Torvik, 2009) with the aim of preven-
ting capital flight to offshore financial centers. 
In discussing tax harmonization, we will reference the report published in July 
2004 by the workgroup of the President of the French Republic, led by Jean-
Pierre Landau1, concerning new international financial regulations. This report 
summarizes the reflections and conclusions of a multidisciplinary group informed 
by diverse horizons and sensitivities.
The report is divided into three parts: the first analyzes and offers a status report 
on development funding; in the second, a scenario for international taxation is 
proposed on the basis of economic rationality, justice and equity; in the third and 
final section, the most prominent international taxation proposals are examined, 
including environment-driven taxation, taxation on financial transactions, and the 
use of special drawing rights.
The report concludes that, technically, there are available solutions that are inspi-
red by a spirit of political will and concerned with economic effectiveness. The 
1 Tax inspector and financial advisor to the French Embassy in London.
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320 group neither declares support for any of the solutions nor formulates privileged 
recommendations. However, it enumerates some principles that may serve as gui-
delines. If the international community decides to commit itself to this report, it 
will be necessary to find justifications and garner broad support for these princi-
ples.
According to Bernard Bouzon (Economics Faculty of the University of Coimbra, 
FEUC, Integrated Cinema Cycle, Debates and Colloquia at the FEUC 2008-2009, 
“Global Economy, Commoditization and Collective Interests: People, Commodi-
ties, Environment and Tax Havens”, (DOC TAGV / FEUC, 2009)), taxation is the 
main tool available to states to compensate for disparities in income distribution.
In its latest report, ATTAC, 2013 (Association pour la Taxation des Transactions 
pour l’Aide aux Citoyens) analyzed fiscal and judicial responsibilities, financial 
opacity and instability, the creation of speculative capital, the massive deregula-
tion of funding, and international institutions and government intentions, iden-
tifying several international-level fiscal options. It concluded that the feasibility of 
either a declaration of the invalidity of transactions or the creation of worldwide 
taxation would depend mainly on political will.
The best known example in the field of tax harmonization, an example limited to 
the scope of indirect taxation, was the definition of the common VAT system in the 
European Union.
3.2.2.2 Request for information
This multilateral measure essentially consists of providing or being willing to 
provide information. This was the measure that the OECD asked of the various tax 
havens in order to obtain more transparency. The internationally accorded infor-
mation exchange norms developed by the OECD and approved by the UN and the 
G20 foresee the complete exchange of information, when solicited, regarding fi-
scal questions that relate to national interests or the lifting of bank secrecy for fi-
scal purposes. Presently, information exchange norms are established by article 26 
of the OECD Model Convention and in the Agreement on Information Exchange 
(2002 Model). In Attachment II, the report presents a summary of the events that 
took place on April 21, 2009, namely the signing of TIEAs by members of the 
OECD, as well as the regulations that have been implemented since 2000. (Table 
A1 in the appendix presents the different international reactions to the signing of 
TIEAs.)
A questionnaire conducted in over 30 countries by the Financial Action Task For-
ce (FATF), which examined their capacities to detect suspicious activities that 
could be hidden in commercial transactions, produced noteworthy results. The 
FATF focused its investigation on the financial system, paying less attention to 
flows made through the physical movement of capital and disregarding  movements 
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321 that result from the manipulation of the international trade system. This system 
clearly embodies a range of hazards and vulnerabilities that can be explored by 
criminal and terrorist organizations.
3.2.2.3 Control of interbank electronic messaging
We shall now discuss the control of interbank electronic messaging, which is si-
milar to multilateral supervision.
Just as there is a Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
(SWIFT Worldwide) whose aim is to facilitate the automatic processing of elec-
tronically communicated messages between banks, there should also be a Super-
visory Authority that could control and filter all these messages to identify every 
operation including exchanges with offshore financial centers, which would then 
be subjected to investigation whenever fraud or tax avoidance was suspected. Ho-
wever, the implementation of this measure, like that of the previously mentioned 
measures, would involve enormous complexity due to the lack of consensus 
among states.
3.2.2.4 G20 and the European Union
The Global Forum on Taxation (GFT), guided by the work of the OECD’s Com-
mittee on Fiscal Affairs, has also developed a norm that has been approved by the 
G20 and United Nations Expert Committee on International Co-operation in Fi-
scal Matters and now serves as the basis for the majority of bilateral Fiscal Agre-
ements and as an internationally agreed upon information exchange norm (Palan 
and Chavagneux, 2007).
The appropriate method to distinguish among jurisdictions that apply the norm 
from those that do not has been assessed in several countries. Although not a strict 
measure of progress, the signing of the 12 information-exchange agreements has 
been taken to be an indicator of progress by a jurisdiction.
It should be noted that the removal of all 70 members from the black list of tax 
havens can be attributed only to a change in criteria, which now include bilateral 
agreements between states.
Tax evasion is such a serious problem for the European Union that the member 
states began experiencing revenue and additional complications because the Sta-
bility Pact limits the use of fiscal instruments. Along these lines, the so-called 
Saving Directive was established in 2005; according to this initiative, all countries 
in the Union are obligated to supply information on the capital incomes of non-
residents to their respective countries.
This joint decision by the EU members is, however, challenged by the fact that 
three of them, Belgium, Austria and Luxemburg, still maintain bank secrecy. They 
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322 withhold taxes, transferring most of them anonymously to the country of origin of 
the taxed person. Laszlo Kovacs, the EU’s Commissioner for Fiscal Affairs, pre-
dicts that this situation will end soon because it is expected to be temporary and 
come to an end when the other 5 Western European countries that are not members 
of the EU (Switzerland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco and Andorra) agree 
to supply information about their banks’ customers. Switzerland is the country 
with which negotiations are the most difficult because it intends to negotiate indi-
vidually with each country to preserve bank secrecy at any cost instead of agreeing 
on a general pact with the block.
The European policy group has adopted a directive that intends to harmonize taxa-
tion within the European perimeter. However, exceptions granted to Belgium, Au-
stria and Luxemburg to enable them to compete with Switzerland allow for situa-
tions that adulterate the system.
The World Bank and the IMF have also developed their own anti-corruption agen-
das, but none of them significantly addresses the opacity of the offshore banking 
system, with the exception of restrictive programs related to money laundering.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), formed by the Heads of State of the G7 
in 1989 to lead a global anti-laundering program, published a report on Money 
Laundering Trade Transactions in June 2006 in which it identified three main 
methods through which financial terrorists evade the authorities by concealing the 
origins of their money and integrating it into the formal economy. These methods 
include the use of the financial system, the physical movement of money, and the 
movement of assets and services through the international trade system.
The FATF composed a text with forty recommendations intended to be introduced 
within the legislative frameworks of each country. However, this had little impact. 
The FATF appears to have become more aware of the potential for manipulation; 
it has legitimized opaque jurisdictions that commit themselves to co-operation in 
the investigation of income from drug trafficking and funding for terrorism.
At a meeting in April 2009, the G20 also sent the message to non-collaborative tax 
havens and jurisdictions2 that it is essential to protect public finances from the 
risks generated by non-collaborative jurisdictions, appealing to these jurisdictions 
to adhere to the international prudence norms related to the anti-money laundering 
and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) areas. With this goal, it is suggested 
that each country’s regulatory body implement and reinforce these supervisory 
procedures based on existing processes, namely through the Financial Services 
Action Plan (FASP)3, and adopt the international standard for information 
2 G20-Declaration on strengthening the financial system – London, April 2, 2009.
3 The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) is a key element in the EU in the attempt to create a single mar-
ket for financial services. It was created in 1999 for a forecasted period of six years and contained 42 articles 
related to the harmonization of the financial service market in the EU.
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323 exchange  approved by the G20 in 20044, as reflected in the UN’s fiscal convention 
model. It is the IMF’s duty, in co-operation with the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB), to assess the implementation of the relevant regulations.
However, in addition to suffering from weak participation, with only 8 countries 
represented by their Finance Ministers, this G20 meeting did not lead to consen-
sus. Is this proof of conflicts of interests on the part of the member states?
Despite all efforts, it is most likely less effective to focus on tax havens than to 
place attention on the legislative dispositions that protect them. States, in coordi-
nation, may refuse to recognize the legality of the present statutes of such entities.
The most visible measures so far have come from American President Barack 
Obama, who, as a result of his own political will and despite the lack of coopera-
tion, worked to lift bank secrecy for approximately 300 Union Bank of Switzer-
land (UBS) bank accounts.
4 discussion and implications
Having discussed the main reasons for the appearance and ultimate consequences 
of tax havens, it can only be concluded that tax havens should be more strongly 
controlled by international regulators such as the International Monetary Fund or 
the World Bank. However, the apparent healthy and wealthy state of many tax 
havens5 and the increasing number of countries developing new forms of tax ha-
vens lead us to conclude this discussion by pointing out the three main reasons for 
the increasing interest in tax havens.
First, the development of tax havens results from the relatively free circulation of 
money around the world. Investors are interested in choosing the best places for 
their investments; therefore, they support the ability to move their money freely, 
without restrictions related to distance, amount, or type of investment product.
Second, the current regulations (despite Basel I and II) are sufficiently elastic. 
Consequently, international money circulation cannot be significantly decreased 
in terms of volume or speed.
Finally, the creation of tax havens is used as a rapid method to boost small econo-
mies in accordance with the underlying spirit of the law that creates this type of 
jurisdiction. These small, highly open and deregulated economies usually take 
advantage of tax havens as strong sources of foreign direct investment and 
4 Group of 20 (G20): created in 1999, this group was formed by the financial ministers and heads of the cen-
tral banks of the 19 major economies of the world plus the European Union.
5 The situation of Cyprus (publicly discussed in the final weeks of March 2013) raised serious concerns rela-
ted to the fundamentals of this apparent wealth of some tax havens. With its particular characteristics as an 
economy whose bank flows are eight times more significant than its real GDP, Cyprus had to be funded by a 
‟tro ika” constituted by the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Mone-
tary Fund.
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324  robustness for their banking systems. Therefore, even though tax havens can dimi-
nish the amounts of available money and taxable income in some medium or large 
countries, they can ultimately stimulate the economic growth of small countries.
Freedoms often come at a cost. The cost of being able to freely circulate money 
around the world is the growth of tax havens. To counteract this growth, however, 
tax havens cannot simply be eliminated. If a currency is prohibited, other curren-
cies (even unofficial ones) will appear to help all traders in the market. If current 
tax havens disappear, other types of tax havens, probably with new and attractive 
characteristics, will appear as substitutes almost instantaneously.
The general solution is to increase the transparency of the official reports of tax 
havens (from their governments and financial entities) to collaborate against fiscal 
crimes and money laundering around the world. As is commonly understood, if 
you and your State know where your neighbor hides his money, your fiscal autho-
rities can diminish his benefits when he does not contribute to common expenses. 
Tax havens may not receive as much money from some taxpayers if the transpa-
rency of official reports increases, but there will be an overall improvement when 
local taxes decrease. Financial balance and stability will improve. The local banks 
will also benefit, as will consulting and auditing firms. Furthermore, tax havens 
will no longer be social purgatories for many of their citizens.
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table a1
Regulatory measures on tax havens
Countries, territories, 
jurisdictions
Preferential tax regimes and 
potentially harmful Offshore 
Financial Centers (OFC) / Tax 
Havens (TA)
Institution
OECD EU
OECD 
(2000)
IMF 
(2008)
Senate 
USA
TJN 
(2007)
Signing  
of 12 
TIEAs (1)
Jurisdictions 
that have com-
mitted to signing 
the 12 TIEAs
Savings 
Directive / 
Exception 
(Exp)
American Samoa      
Andorra TA TA TA x Exp
Anguilla TA TA TA TA x x (2)
Antigua and Barbuda TA TA TA TA x  
Arab Republic of Yemen    
Argentina   x  
Aruba TA TA TA TA x x (2)
Ascension    
Australia OFC  x  
Austria OFC  x  
Bahamas TA TA TA TA x  
Bahrain TA TA TA x  
Barbados TA TA TA TA x  
Belgium TA TA x x
Belize TA TA TA TA x  
Bermuda Islands  TA TA TA x  
Bolivia    
Brazil   x  
British Virgin Islands (B.V.I.) TA TA TA TA x Exp (2)
Brunei   x  
Canada OFC  x  
Cayman Islands TA TA TA TA x x (2)
Channel Islands (Alderney) TA TA TA  
Channel Islands (Brechou)    
Channel Islands  
(Greater Sark and Little Sark)
TA TA TA  
Channel Islands (Guernsey) TA TA TA TA x  
Channel Islands (Herm)    
Channel Islands (Jersey) TA TA TA TA x  
Channel Islands (Jethou)    
Channel Islands (Lihou)    
Chile   x  
China   x  
Christmas Island    
Cook Islands TA TA TA x  
Costa Rica  TA TA TA x  
Cyprus TA TA TA TA x  
Czech Republic   x x
Denmark   x  
Djibouti    
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Countries, territories, 
jurisdictions
Preferential tax regimes and 
potentially harmful Offshore 
Financial Centers (OFC) / Tax 
Havens (TA)
Institution
OECD EU
OECD 
(2000)
IMF 
(2008)
Senate 
USA
TJN 
(2007)
Signing  
of 12 
TIEAs (1)
Jurisdictions 
that have com-
mitted to signing 
the 12 TIEAs
Savings 
Directive / 
Exception 
(Exp)
Dominica TA TA TA TA x  
Dubai  TA x  
England (London)  TA x x
Estonia   x  
Falkland Islands or Malvinas    
Fiji Islands    
Finland (Aland) OFC  x  
France OFC  x  
French Polynesia    
Gambia    
Germany (Frankfurt) OFC TA x x
Gibraltar TA TA TA TA x x
Greece OFC  x  
Grenade TA TA TA TA x  
Guatemala   x
Guernsey   Exp
Guyana    
Honduras    
Hong Kong  TA TA TA  
Hungary OFC TA x  
Iceland OFC TA x  
India   x  
Ireland OFC TA TA x x
Island of Guam    
Island of Niue TA TA TA x
Island of Saints Peter  
and Miquelon
   
Island of St. Helena    
Island of Tuvalu    
Qeshm Island    
Isle of Man TA TA TA TA x Exp
Israel (Tel Aviv)  TA x  
Italy (Campione d'Italia  
e Trieste)
OFC TA x x
Jamaica    
Japan   x  
Jersey   Exp
Jordan    
Kelling to Cocos Islands    
Kiribati Island    
Korea OFC TA x  
Kuwait    
Latvia  TA   
Lebanon  TA TA  
Liberia TA TA x  
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Countries, territories, 
jurisdictions
Preferential tax regimes and 
potentially harmful Offshore 
Financial Centers (OFC) / Tax 
Havens (TA)
Institution
OECD EU
OECD 
(2000)
IMF 
(2008)
Senate 
USA
TJN 
(2007)
Signing  
of 12 
TIEAs (1)
Jurisdictions 
that have com-
mitted to signing 
the 12 TIEAs
Savings 
Directive / 
Exception 
(Exp)
Lichtenstein TA TA TA TA x Exp
Luxembourg (holdings) OFC TA TA TA x x
Macao  TA TA  
Malaysia (Labuán)  TA TA x  
Maldive Islands  TA  
Malta TA TA TA TA x  
Marshall Islands TA TA TA x  
Mauritius TA TA TA x  
Mexico   x  
Monaco TA TA TA x Exp
Monserrate TA TA TA x x (2)
Nauru TA TA TA TA x  
Netherlands OFC TA x  
Netherlands Antilles TA TA TA TA x x
New Zealand   x  
Norfolk Island    
Northern Mariana Islands  TA  
Norway   x x
Pacific Islands    
Palau Islands  TA   
Panama TA TA TA TA x  
Philippines   x  
Pitcairn Island    
Poland   x x
Portugal (Madeira) OFC TA x x
Portugal (Santa Maria – 
Azores)
OFC  x x
Puerto Rico    
Qatar    
Republic of Vanuatu TA TA TA TA x  
Russia (Ingushetia)  TA x  
Saint Kitts and Nevis TA TA TA TA x  
Saint Vincent and Grenadines TA TA TA TA x  
Samoa TA TA TA TA x  
San Marino TA  x Exp
Sao Tome and Principe  TA  
Seychelles TA TA TA x  
Singapore  TA TA TA x  
Slovak Republic   x  
Slovenia   x  
Solomon Islands    
Somalia  TA  
South Africa  TA x  
Spain (Melilha) OFC TA x  
St. Lucia TA TA TA TA x  
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Countries, territories, 
jurisdictions
Preferential tax regimes and 
potentially harmful Offshore 
Financial Centers (OFC) / Tax 
Havens (TA)
Institution
OECD EU
OECD 
(2000)
IMF 
(2008)
Senate 
USA
TJN 
(2007)
Signing  
of 12 
TIEAs (1)
Jurisdictions 
that have com-
mitted to signing 
the 12 TIEAs
Savings 
Directive / 
Exception 
(Exp)
Sultanate of Oman    
Svalbard Islands  
(Spitsbergen archipelago  
and the island Bjornoya)
   
Swaziland    
Sweden OFC  x x
Switzerland OFC TA TA TA x Exp
Taiwan (Taipei)  TA  
Tokelau    
Tonga TA TA  
Trinidad and Tobago    
Tristan da Cunha Island    
Turkey (Istanbul) OFC  x  
Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus
 TA  
Turks and Caicos Islands TA TA TA TA x Exp (2)
United Arab Emirates   x  
Uruguay  TA x  
USA (NY) OFC TA x  
Virgin Islands of the United 
States of America TA   TA x  
Total tax havens 41 46 35 71   
(1) TIEAs: Tax Information Exchange Agreements. 
(2) Outside Eurozone.
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